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Jessica Fisher*

Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association:
“Modern Warfare” on First Amendment
Protection of Violent Video Games

Introduction
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,1 the Supreme Court of
the United States struck down a California law that restricted violent video game
sales to minors because the law infringed upon constitutionally protected speech
and the legislature had neither a compelling government interest nor proscribed
means narrowly tailored to that interest.2 The Court held that the California law was
unconstitutional because the law placed restrictions on free speech, protected by the
First Amendment, and those restrictions did not pass strict scrutiny.3 The Court
determined that the California law did not pass strict scrutiny because strict
scrutiny requires that California show an actual state interest in restricting speech
and that the law is as narrowly tailored as possible to serve that interest.4 The Court
clearly stated that California could not meet this heavy burden.5 However, in its
opinion, the Court too hastily concluded that video games should be treated the
same as other media of speech such as radio broadcasts, print publications, and
television without further considering their relatively new and uniquely interactive
qualities.6 The Court should have deferred to the legislature and experts who study
© 2013 Jessica Fisher
* J.D., University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, May 2013; B.A. Philosophy, Politics &
Economics, Juniata College, May 2010. I would like to thank my past and present Journal colleagues. Also, I
express my deepest thanks to my friends and family, especially to my parents for their wonderful love, support,
and encouragement.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
2. Id. at 2738–39, 2741.
3. Id. at 2738.
4. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that the Supreme Court came to the correct conclusion when it
determined that the California law attempted to regulate the content of violent video games, which are a form
of speech that is protected by the First Amendment. A law seeking to place limits on the content of protected
speech must pass strict scrutiny, and the California law was unable to meet this standard).
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the Court should not have so quickly dismissed the new and evolving
medium of violent video games as the same as other media of expression such as books, radio broadcasts, and
motion pictures).
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video games and their effects before quickly determining that this rapidlyadvancing and increasingly interactive technology presents no new challenges to the
First Amendment jurisprudence of freedom of speech.7 In the future, states that
wish to restrict violent video game sales to minors should more narrowly tailor
statutes to very specific depictions of violent situations that also include obscenity
for a better chance of meeting the strict scrutiny that is required of laws that
infringe upon First Amendment rights.8

I. The Case
Respondents, Video Software Dealers Association (VSDA) and Entertainment
Software Association (ESA), brought an action against Petitioners, various
members of the California state government,9 alleging that California Civil Code §§
1746–1746.5 (“the Act”) was unconstitutional.10 The Act prohibited the sale or
rental of violent video games to minors without parental permission and required
that merchants of these games display a specific symbol on the front packaging of
the video game.11 Specifically, VSDA and ESA alleged that (1) video games are a
form of speech protected by the First Amendment, (2) the definition of “violent
video game” is vague, and (3) the provision of the Act requiring violent video games
to be labeled in this manner violates the First Amendment.12
In crafting this legislation, California State Senator Leeland Yee unsuccessfully
attempted to create a law that prohibited the sale of violent video games to minors.13
Former California Governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, signed California Assembly
Bill 1179 of 2005 into law on October 7, 2005,14 and it was to take effect on January
1, 2006, as California Civil Code §§ 1746–1746.5.15 The Act provided that “[a]
person may not sell or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent video

7.
8.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C (arguing that a state should closely tailor a statute restricting the distribution of
violent video games to minors by targeting very particular portrayals of obscenity such as nudity, rape, and
other crimes of a sexual nature).
9. Respondents were Arnold Schwarzenegger, former Governor of California; Bill Lockyer, former
Attorney General of California; George Kennedy, former District Attorney for Santa Clara County; Richard
Doyle, former City Attorney for the City of San Jose; and Ann Miller Ravel former County Counsel for the
Country of Santa Clara. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1037–39 (N.D.
Cal. 2005).
10. Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1039.
11. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2006), invalidated by Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct.
2729 (2011).
12. Video Software Dealers Ass’n, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1039.
13. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011); A.B. 1179, 2005–06 Leg. Sess. (Ca. 2006).
14. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732. California Assembly Bill 1179 of 2005 was to become California Civil Code §
1746–1746.5. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 1179, 2005 Leg., 2005 Sess. (Cal. 2005).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746–1746.5 (West 2009).
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game to a minor,”16 and defined “violent video game” as “a video game in which the
range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or
sexually assaulting an image of a human being.”17 The Act also imposed a
requirement that violent video games be labeled with an “18” of a specific size and
color on the front packaging of the video game.18 A merchant or owner of a business
who violated any provision of the Act is subject to a fine of up to $1,000.19
Shortly after former Governor Schwarzenegger signed California Assembly Bill
1179,20 VSDA and ESA filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California and a motion for preliminary injunction soon after,
seeking to prevent the enforcement of the Act.21 The District Court held that the
costs of implementing the Act, including the infringement of First Amendment
rights and expenses associated with the implementation of the Act, outweighed the
potential harm of a delay in the implementation of the Act.22 The District Court
granted VSDA and ESA’s motion for preliminary injunction and enjoined
California from enforcing the Act.23 Next, VSDA and ESA moved for summary
judgment and for enforcement of the Act to be permanently enjoined.24 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of California held that the Act was
unconstitutional, granted summary judgment, and permanently enjoined
Petitioners from enforcing the Act on August 6, 2007.25 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.26 The court of appeals
concluded that the Act was a content-based regulation subject to strict scrutiny and
was presumptively invalid, because, despite the State demonstrating a compelling
16. CIV. § 1746.1 (providing that: “(d)(1) ‘Violent video game’ means a video game in which the range of
options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a
human being, if those acts are depicted in the game in a manner that does either of the following:
(A) Comes with the following descriptions: (i) A reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would
find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors. (ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the
community as to what is suitable for minors. (iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors. (B) Enables the player to virtually inflict serious injury upon images of
human beings or characters with substantially human characteristics in a manner which is especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved in that it involves torture or serious physical abuse to the victim”).
17. CIV. § 1746.
18. CIV. § 1746.2.
19. CIV. § 1746.3.
20. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 1179, 2005 Leg., 2005 Sess. (Cal. 2005).
21. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1034, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2005),
aff’d, No. C-05-04188 RMW, 2007 WL 2261546 (N.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d
sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
22. Id. at 1048.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188 RMW, 2007 WL 2261546, at *12
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007), aff’d, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n,
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
26. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 967 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom.
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
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interest to protect the physical and psychological well-being of minors, it did not
tailor the restriction to the least-restrictive means possible to achieve this purpose.27
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if the Act comported with the
First Amendment of the Constitution.28

II. Legal Background
In order for a challenged legislative act that restricts historically protected speech to
be declared constitutional, the State must show that the legislature has a compelling
government interest to protect and that the act is narrowly tailored to protect that
interest.29 There are limited categories of speech that historically have not qualified
for First Amendment protection such as speech that incites violence,30 fighting
words,31 advocacy of illegal conduct,32 defamation,33 and obscenity.34 New categories
that have not been historically unprotected cannot be added to this list.35 Depictions
of violence have been traditionally protected,36 and violent video games qualify as
speech that is protected by the First Amendment.37 Legislative acts that propose
restrictions on speech must pass strict scrutiny.38 The plaintiff has the burden of
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 965.
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732 (2011).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (holding that an ordinance that is overbroad
does not pass the strict scrutiny required by statutes that restrict First Amendment freedom of speech).
30. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (holding that inflammatory speech that is likely to
produce imminent lawless action is not protected by the First Amendment).
31. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1942) (holding that words uttered with the
purpose to inflict injury or immediately incite an immediate breach of the peace are of no social value and are
part of a category of speech not protected by the First Amendment).
32. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (introducing the “Clear and Present Danger Test” and
holding that speech that advocates for immediate and illegal action is not protected by the First Amendment).
33. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283–86 (1964) (stating a test to determine
instances of libel, or defamation, against a public figure).
34. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (holding that speech whose “dominant theme . . . taken
as a whole appeals to the prurient interest” is a category of speech that is not protected by the First
Amendment).
35. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (holding that “depictions of animal cruelty” is
not a class of speech that has been historically unprotected by the Constitution, and this new class cannot be
created and added to the list of existing unprotected classes of speech that have a long history of being excluded
from the protections of the First Amendment) (internal quotations omitted).
36. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (discussing that the obscenity exception
to the First Amendment only covers depictions of sexual conduct and not what the legislature finds to be
shocking or violent). See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (determining that to be
considered obscenity, speech must appeal to the prurient interest, which puts it outside of First Amendment
protection); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (discussing how in order to be considered obscenity,
the speech must be erotic); Roth, 354 U.S. at 489 (providing that obscenity must have an element that applies to
the prurient interest).
37. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736 (“California’s argument would fare better if there were a longstanding
tradition in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence, but there is none.”).
38. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992); see Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1972) (discussing
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showing that (1) government has an actual interest that it wishes to protect,39 and
(2) the act was narrowly drawn to protect this interest.40
A. Depictions of Violence Are One of the Historically Protected Categories of Speech,
and Violent Video Games Qualify for First Amendment Protection
The First Amendment provides protection for speech stating, “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”41 The Free Speech Clause prohibits restrictions on an individual’s
freedom of speech, which has historically been recognized to include
entertainment.42 The First Amendment protects entertainment including books,
plays, radio broadcast, television, and movies.43 As technology continues to advance,
the freedom of speech has been extended to video games.44 The First Amendment
protects these media, because “[a]s a general matter, . . . government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.”45
There are exceptions to the general rule that the First Amendment protects
speech. Historical categories of unprotected speech exist: speech that incites
violence,46 fighting words,47 advocacy of illegal conduct,48 defamation,49 and
the relatively vigorous level of scrutiny requires that the means of legislation must substantially further the ends
of the legislation in order for the legislation to pass the strict scrutiny that the First Amendment requires).
39. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (“If a statute regulates speech
based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.”) (citing Sable
Commc’ns of California, Inc. v. FCC et al., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (providing that “[t]he Government may,
however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it
chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest” and determining that there is a
governmental interest in protecting the well-being of minors)).
40. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395; see generally Gunther, supra note 38 (discussing how one of the requirements of
strict scrutiny is that an act that infringes on speech must be narrowly drawn so that the means of the act
support its ends).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1.
42. Patrick M. Garry, Defining Speech in an Entertainment Age: The Case of First Amendment Protection for
Video Games, 57 SMU L. REV. 139, 148 (2004).
43. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952) (concluding that just because books,
newspapers, magazines, and motion pictures are produced and sold for a profit does not mean that they are
outside of the protection of the first amendment and providing that motion pictures are another medium of
speech that is granted protection by the First Amendment).
44. See generally id. (discussing that first amendment protections of speech do not change depending on
the type of medium through which the speech is expressed and stating, “[t]hat books, newspapers, and
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment”).
45. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotations omitted) (citing
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) (quoting Police Dep’t. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972))).
46. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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obscenity.50 Although this list is not exhaustive, the categories of unprotected speech
are limited to those that have a history of not being protected or contribute little
social value.51 Depictions of violence are one of the categories of speech that have
been historically protected by the First Amendment, although there have been
attempts to censor speech in this area over the decades.52 Specifically, governments
have attempted to prove that motion pictures are outside of the First Amendment’s
protections.53 However, the Court held in Joseph Burnstyn, Inc. v. Wilson that even
though movies could pose a different type of danger to minors than other media of
speech before them, movies do not require “unbridled censorship” and exclusion
from First Amendment protection.54
The Supreme Court recently held in United States v. Stevens that absent a
historical precedent of protection of a particular category of speech, new categories
of unprotected speech may not be added.55 In Stevens, Respondent, Robert J.
Stevens, a small-time author and producer, challenged his arrest under a statute
that criminalized the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of
animal cruelty.56 This type of video production was declared illegal under the law,
and Stevens was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania and given a 37-month jail sentence in 1999 for his
involvement in those productions.57
The Supreme Court held in Stevens, a statute that criminalized the commercial
sale, possession, and depiction of animal cruelty was invalid under the First
Amendment because it was substantially overbroad.58 In the reasoning of the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (“Our decisions . . . cannot be taken as
establishing a free-wheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First
Amendment. Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not
yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law. But if so, there is no evidence that
‘depictions of animal cruelty’ is among them.”).
52. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518–20 (1948) (discussing that violence is not part of the obscenity
that the Constitution is permitted to regulate, and concluding that the statute in this case restricting the
possession of certain magazines contained no unconstitutional obscenity).
53. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952).
54. Id. at 502.
55. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (holding that absent a historical background of protection, new categories of
speech may not be added to the already designated categories of unprotected speech). Stevens was decided only
a few days before Brown, and it has created a lot of controversy in Free Speech jurisprudence, but, as the Court
affirmed in Brown, new categories of unprotected speech may not be created “absent a long . . . tradition of
proscription.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).
56. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1582–83 (discussing a law that sought to provide that depictions where an animal
is being maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed is not protected by the First Amendment).
57. Id. at 1584.
58. Id. at 1592.
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opinion, Chief Justice Roberts relied heavily on the notion that there are only a few
limited categories of unprotected speech.59 In the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts
emphasized that when the Court has identified categories of speech that are outside
of First Amendment protection, it is not done simply on the basis of cost-benefit
analysis, as the Government alleged in this case, but instead there must be some
other compelling interest in protecting a class of individuals.60 Ultimately, the Court
“decline[d] to carve out from the First Amendment any novel exception for [the
Statute] . . . ,” therefore, depictions of animal cruelty are protected by the First
Amendment.61
As Stevens illustrates, there have been recent attempts to add more categories of
unprotected speech that have been unsuccessful.62 Although there may be new and
undiscovered categories of unprotected speech added to the list, states have been
more successful in expanding existing categories of unprotected speech.63 For
example, the Court in Ginsberg v. New York expanded the category of obscenity to
include distribution of pornography to minors.64 The Court was careful to note that
this was merely an expansion of obscenity by adding the words “to minors” to an
already constitutional prohibition on speech, and a new category of unprotected
speech was not created.65 Thus, courts have held that depictions of violence in
various media are protected speech.66
Attempts by states to censor violent video games are relatively new and legal
action relating to video game violence did not develop until the mid-1990s and
early 2000s, and none have been successful at categorizing violent video games as an
unprotected category of speech.67 Partially due to the urging of Senators Lieberman
and Krohl over concerns of violence portrayed in video games, the video game
industry established the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB) as a means of
self-censorship in the videogame industry.68 However, there was no litigation
surrounding violent video games and the debate about their censorship did not heat

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1584–85.
See id. at 1585.
Id. at 1586.
See id. at 1584 (“Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but
have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law. But if so, there is no evidence that
‘depictions of animal cruelty’ is among them.”).
63. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (holding that a statute expanding the definition of
obscenity by adding the words “to minors” to each provision did not invade freedom of expression).
64. Id. at 643 (adjusting the definition of obscene materials to include a prohibition on the sale of sexually
explicit materials to minors).
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (discussing how motion pictures are
one of the many media of speech that is protected by the First Amendment).
67. Jeffrey O’Holleran, Blood Code: The History and Future of Video Game Censorship, 8 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 571, 580 (2010).
68. Id. at 583–84.
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up until after the violent school shootings in high schools in the late 1990s.69
Throughout the early and mid-2000s, Jack Thompson became famous for his
campaign against violent video games and filed many suits on behalf of many
victims violently murdered by perpetrators who may have been influenced by
violent video games.70 Aside from a few laws, similar to the one in Brown, the only
other attempt has been to place restrictions on the packaging of games considered
to be particularly violent by the ESRB.71
B. Legislative Acts That Propose Restrictions on Protected Categories of Speech Must
Pass Strict Scrutiny by Having a Compelling Government Interest and Being Narrowly
Tailored to Protect That Compelling Interest, a Two-Prong Test That Places a High
Burden on the Government
In First Amendment litigation, the burden is on the government to show that an act
can pass strict scrutiny.72 The state must prove that the act is aimed at eliminating
an actual problem.73 Also, the government must demonstrate that the means by
which the act restricts speech is tailored in the narrowest way to solve this
problem.74 An act is not narrowly tailored if it is underinclusive or overinclusive.75
First, a plaintiff must show that there is an actual and compelling problem that
the government seeks to remedy with the act in order to pass strict scrutiny.76 A
legislature can show a compelling problem by the use of evidence in the form of
case-studies and research by people deemed to be experts in a particular field.77 If a

69. Id. at 584. In the wake of tragedies such as the school shooting at Columbine, video game violence drew
more attention and even became part of the 2000 presidential campaign. Id.
70. Id. at 586–93. Although he was disbarred for life due to the tactics he used in his cases, Jack Thompson
was still an important figure in the fight against violent video games. He even helped work on some legislation
against violent video games. Id. at 592–93.
71. See, e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646, 65051 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (citing Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001) and Interactive Digital
Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2003)) (holding video games were protected
speech in a case that involved specific packaging restrictions for violent video games).
72. See generally United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) (discussing that the
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the legislature has presented evidence of an actual problem that is in
need of solving and the law is aimed at solving this problem).
73. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2417, 2422 (1996) (“For a law to be narrowly tailored, the government must prove the Court’s satisfaction
that the law actually advances the interest.” (footnote omitted)).
74. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).
75. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1993) (holding that a
statute aimed at outlawing animal sacrifice in religious ceremonies is underinclusive, as the statute was aimed at
discriminating against the Santeria religion, which uses animal sacrifice in its religious rituals).
76. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 818 (“When First Amendment compliance is the point to be proved, the risk of
nonpersuasion—operative in all trials—must rest with the Government, not with the citizen.” (citation
omitted)).
77. This is often done by presenting witness testimony at legislative committee hearings on the particular
topic. See, e.g., Michael Dresser & Timothy B. Wheeler, Thousands Go to Annapolis for Gun-Control Rally and
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court determines that the state has shown that a particular interest is compelling,
the government has passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test.78
There are few statutes that have passed this first prong by showing that there is
an actual and compelling government interest that the act protects. One such
statute restricts the shipment or transportation of pornography depicting minors.79
Conversely, the Court recently held in United States v. Alvarez80 that the Stolen
Valor Act81 was unconstitutional, because it violated the First Amendment.82 The
Stolen Valor Act made it a misdemeanor to falsely represent oneself as having
received a United States military honor.83 Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy
declared that the Court has never decided that speech falls outside of First
Amendment protections based on falsity alone.84 What is particularly interesting in
this case was the Court’s discussion of compelling government interest.85 The
plurality emphasized how the First Amendment mandates that there must be a
direct causal link between the restriction on speech between the act’s restriction and
the injury that is to be prevented.86 In Alvarez, the Court determined that the link
between protecting the military honors system and the Act’s restriction on false
statements was not shown.87 This was largely due to the fact that the Government
did not rely on much research, case studies, and expert testimony to show that
punishing these false statements in order to uphold the U.S. military honor was a
compelling government interest.88
Next, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the piece of legislation is narrowly
tailored to serve its interest.89 An act is narrowly drawn if it is not overinclusive or
Hearing, BALT. SUN, Feb. 6, 2013, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-02-06/news/bs-md-omalley-guns20130204_1_assault-weapons-gun-control-gun-buyers (discussing a recent hearing on gun-control in
Annapolis, Maryland and mentioning the process for legislative hearings).
78. See generally Volokh, supra note 73 (discussing how a law must pass strict scrutiny, including how a law
must show a compelling government interest).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006). In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, the Court held that child pornography
may be deemed obscene without first passing the Miller Test for several reasons, including that the government
has a compelling interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756
(1992).
80. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), invalidated by Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551.
82. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
84. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2540 (discussing how Stevens determined that there may exist some new
categories of unprotected speech but stating that the Court has not yet examined false statements as one of these
categories).
85. Id. at 2549–50.
86. Id at 2549 (“The lack of a causal link between the Government’s stated interest and the Act is not the
only way in which the Act is not actually necessary to achieve the Government’s stated interest. The
Government has not shown, and cannot show why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest.”).
87. Id.
88. See id. (describing how the Government did not and could not show how punishing false statements
served the end of protecting the military honors system).
89. See Volokh, supra note 73, at 2418.
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underinclusive.90 An act is overinclusive if it includes types of speech that need not
be prohibited by the statute.91 More specifically, “[a] law is not narrowly tailored if
it restricts a significant amount of speech that doesn’t implicate the government
interest.”92 For example, a law that prohibits a corporation from supporting or
opposing a referendum proposal, because this support might influence an election
outcome, could be considered overinclusive.93 It could be overinclusive, because the
shareholders of the company could unanimously support this referendum outside
of any desire to influence an election.94 Alternatively, a statute is underinclusive if it
does not prohibit all types of like speech.95 Underinclusiveness can lead a court to
doubt that a state is pursuing the interest that it states it wishes to protect with the
enactment of a statute.96 For example, a statute that prohibits animal slaughter, but
is so targeted that it only restricts the slaughter in the manner performed by a
particular religion, is underinclusive.97
Laws that are aimed at limiting minors’ access to violent video games are often
derived from the test in Miller v. California, which sought to clarify and refine the
definition of obscenity.98 The Miller Test has been used for decades to determine if a
form of expression is obscene, and thus not protected by the First Amendment.99
Generally, the Miller Test is a three-prong test that can be used to determine if
whether expression can be labeled as obscene.100 The Miller Test is not as difficult to
pass as strict scrutiny, and the Government has a much lower burden to prove in
order to pass the test.101 However, this test is the standard used for free speech cases
involving obscenity. In Ginsburg v. New York, the Court upheld the constitutionality

90. See Volokh, supra note 73, at 2422 (discussing how a law is not narrowly tailored if it is overinclusive by
restricting speech that does not serve the government interest, and a law is not narrowly tailored if there are less
restrictive means to reach the ends).
91. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994) (holding that a law which prohibits an entire
medium of speech, in this instance yard signs, is so overinclusive that it cannot be said to be narrowly tailored).
92. See Volokh, supra note 73, at 2422.
93. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978).
94. Id.
95. See Volokh, supra note 73, at 2431–32.
96. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1993) (holding that a
statute aimed at outlawing animal sacrifice in religious ceremonies is underinclusive, as the statute was aimed at
discriminating against the Santeria religion, which uses animal sacrifice in its religious rituals).
97. Id.
98. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36–37 (1973).
99. Id. at 24 (outlining the Miller Test which states, “[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)
(internal quotations omitted))).
100. Id.
101. Zachary B., The Miller Test and the Value of Obscene Speech, YALE LAW & TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 15, 2012),
http://www.yalelawtech.org/uncategorized/the-miller-test-and-the-value-of-obscene-speech/.
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of a New York statute that altered the Miller Test by adding the word “to minors” to
each section of the test.102 The Court reasoned that the law was narrowly tailored in
that it served its purpose of protecting minors.103 Thus, New York was successful in
passing a law that banned the sale of “girly magazines” to minors by determining
that these pornographic magazines were classified as obscene and not protected by
the First Amendment.104

III. The Court’s Reasoning
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Supreme Court declared that
California’s violent video game act was unconstitutional because it violated the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.105 The Court determined that (1) violent video
games qualify for first amendment protection,106 (2) new categories of unprotected
speech may not be added,107 and (3) California did not satisfy its burden of proof by
showing both that the law was justified by a compelling government interest and
that it was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.108
A. Violent Video Games Qualify for First Amendment Protection
The Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that video games qualify for
First Amendment Protection.109 The Court has long recognized that the Free Speech
Clause protects forms of entertainment such as books, plays, and movies.110 This
protection extends to video games, because the Freedom of Speech does not vary
depending on medium.111 Further, “[g]overnment has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”112

102. 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968) (determining that material that is constitutionally protected and may be
distributed to adults is not always protected when it is distributed to minors).
103. Id. at 637.
104. Id.
105. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741–42 (2011).
106. Id. at 2733.
107. Id. at 2734.
108. Id. at 2738.
109. Id. at 2733.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) (holding that the principle of
freedom of speech does not vary when new and different media of speech are involved).
112. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (citing Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
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B. New Categories of Unprotected Speech May Not Be Added to the Already-Existing
List Absent a Historical Precedent That the Speech Is Unprotected
The Court noted that there exist few categories of speech that are an exception to
Freedom of Speech protection: obscenity, incitement, and fighting words.113 These
classes are all well-defined and narrowly-tailored, and “the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.”114 The Court relied on the holding in Stevens that new categories of
unprotected speech may not be added to this list absent a history of exclusion from
First Amendment protection, when the Court declined to afford First Amendment
protection to the depiction of animal cruelty.115 The Court concluded that Stevens
controlled this instant case.116 In both cases, the legislature modeled statutes after
obscenity regulation,117 but obscenity only covers depictions of “sexual conduct”
and not depictions of animal cruelty or violent video games.118 Although the
definition of obscenity can be adjusted, the Court has long determined that the
definition of obscenity does not include the depiction of violent acts.119 The Court
determined that the California Act attempted to create an entirely new category of
speech aimed at protecting children.120 The Court recognized that the legislature has
a legitimate power to protect children, but “[it] does not include a free-floating
power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.”121
Next, the Court examined other media that depict violent acts protected by the
Free Speech Clause.122 Grimm’s Fairy Tales, Snow White, The Odyssey, The Inferno,
and Lord of the Flies are all books containing violence that are regularly consumed
by minors and are protected by the First Amendment.123 However, the Court
113. Id.; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
114. Id. (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72).
115. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734; United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010).
116. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2734–35; see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
119. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 517–19 (1947).
120. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2736–37.
123. Id.; DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY, Inferno, Cantos XXXIV, ls. 56–59 (Tom Griffith ed.,
Reverend H. F. Cary trans., Wordsworth Classics of World Literature 2009) (1472) (depicting the main
character’s journey through hell, and containing a particularly graphic scene in which Satan is gnawing the
bodies of “the traitors,” including Brutus, Cassius, and Judas Iscariot); WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES
163 (Penguin 3rd ed. 1999) (describing a violent scene in which young boys stranded on an island turn against
each other, which eventually leads to the brutal death of one of the boys being crushed by a boulder pushed by
another boy); JACOB GRIMM & WILHELM GRIMM, THE COMPLETE FAIRY TALES OF THE BROTHERS GRIMM 53–59
(Jack Zipes trans., 3rd ed. 2003) (containing the story of Hansel & Gretel, in which two young children burn a
cannibalistic witch in a wood stove stating, “[t]he ungodly witch to be burned to ashes”); HOMER, THE ODYSSEY
(Lillian E. Doherty ed., Oxford Readings in Classic Studies 2009) (1488) (depicting many scenes with violence
including Odysseus blinding the Cyclops with a wooden stake and Odysseus shooting all of his lover’s suitors
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recognized that these and other works depicting violence such as dime novels, radio
shows, movies, television, and song lyrics have all encountered resistance over the
years.124 California argued that video games are different because of their interactive
qualities.125 The Court rejected this stating that violent, interactive literature has
been around since the 1960s with choose-your-own-adventure novels.126 The Court
asserted that video games are not a different degree or kind of interactive
technology that is different than other media such as literature,127 citing Judge
Posner’s statement that “the better it is, the more interactive. Literature when it is
successful draws the reader into the story, makes him identify with the characters,
invites him to judge them and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and
sufferings as the reader’s own.”128 Finally, the Court dismissed Justice Alito’s
position that video games are extremely violent.129
C. California Did Not Satisfy Its Burden of Proof by Showing That Either the Law Was
Justified by a Compelling Government Interest and That It Was Narrowly Tailored to
Serve That Interest
The Court held that the Act imposed a restriction on the content of the speech.130
Thus, the Act had to pass strict scrutiny by demonstrating a compelling government
interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest in order to be
constitutional.131 The Court admitted that the Act had a compelling state interest to
protect youth,132 but California did not meet its burden of showing that the law was
justified by this compelling government reason.133 California relied on evidence and
studies by psychologists to show a connection between exposure to violent video
games and harmful effects to children, but this evidence was not compelling.134
Although the studies showed a slight correlation in miniscule effects, such as
children making louder noises after playing violent video games,135 the Court

with a bow and arrows). Grimm’s Fairy Tales also contain the story of Snow White in which an evil Queen is
forced to dance in a pair of hot iron shoes until she drops dead. GRIMM & GRIMM, supra 264–73.
124. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2737 (discussing that in the 1800s, dime novels were blamed for juvenile
delinquency, motion pictures were accused of easily influencing minors and leading them to prison, and other
media such as the radio and comic books were long thought to foster violent behavior of youths).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2737–38. Choose-your-own-adventure novels are books that offer various choices to the author
that may all result in alternate endings of the story.
127. Id. at 2737–38.
128. Id. (citing Am. Amusement Mach. Assn. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)).
129. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742–51 (Alito, J., concurring).
130. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (majority opinion).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2741.
133. Id. at 2738.
134. Id. at 2739.
135. Id.
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determined that the studies did not demonstrate a true connection between playing
violent video games and aggressive actions by minors.136 Thus, the Court reasoned
California could not show that the Act was narrowly tailored to meet its burden of
showing that the Act was justified by a compelling legislative interest with
supporting evidence.137
The Act was not narrowly tailored because it was both underinclusive and
overinclusive.138 The Act was underinclusive, because it singled out video game
sellers instead of restricting sellers of all types of violent material, and California did
not show a compelling reason why it chose to do this.139 Further, the Act was
underinclusive, because it allowed minors to have access to these video games as
long as one parent consented without providing any information on how the
parent-child relationship was to be identified.140 Lastly, the Court determined that
the Act was overinclusive141 because it restricted all minors from purchasing violent
video games when not all minors have parents who actually care if their children
play violent video games.142
The Court ended by stating that this is one statute in a long series of attempts to
censor violent entertainment from children that have failed.143 The Court stated that
it does not intend to imply that protecting minors from violence was not a valid
concern of the court,144 but it was only the role of the Court to determine whether
California’s Act was unconstitutional.145 California showed a legitimate legislative
concern that it sought to protect, but the Act was not narrowly tailored to fully
address these concerns.146
D. Concurrence of Justice Alito
Justice Alito concurred with the majority that this particular law was not framed
with the precision that the Constitution demands and it could not be sustained.147
Justice Alito concluded that the Act failed to provide the fair notice that the

136. Id. (citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009)) (stating that
“the same effects have been found when children watch cartoons starring Bugs Bunny or the Road Runner, or
when they play video games like Sonic the Hedgehog that are rated [appropriate for all ages], or even when they
‘vie[w] a picture of a gun’”).
137. Id. at 2738.
138. Id. at 2740.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2741.
142. Id. at 2742.
143. Id. at 2741.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2742.
147. Id. at 2742 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Constitution required.148 However, he strongly cautioned the Court not to
prematurely conclude that violent video games are the same as any other type of
media, such as books.149
Justice Alito elaborated on his point that violent video games are constantlydeveloping and have emerging characteristics that the Court too quickly dismissed
as nothing new and hastily concluded that all types of literature are interactive.150 He
provided examples from particularly violent video games and discussed how the
interactive experiences in these games are quite different than reading about a
violent murder in a book.151 Thus, Justice Alito only went so far as to declare the Act
unconstitutional and did not want to “squelch legislative efforts to deal with what is
perceived by some to be a significant and developing social problem.”152
E. Dissent of Justice Thomas
In his dissent, Justice Thomas concluded that the First Amendment has not
historically protected “speech to minor children bypassing their parents.”153 Justice
Thomas extensively examined how speech to minor children has been protected
throughout history and concluded that the issue was largely up to the discretion of
the parent with a variety of laws aimed at preserving parental control of minors.154
He concluded that because this category of speech has never been constitutionally
protected, California’s violent video game act does not implicate the First
Amendment and was not facially unconstitutional.155
F. Dissent of Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer would have upheld the statute as facially constitutional but rejected
the challenges of the violent video game industry.156 Justice Breyer agreed that the
Court correctly held that the Act cannot pass the strict scrutiny that the
Constitution demands,157 but he recognized the difficulty of mounting a facial attack
on an activity that involves action and speech.158 He discussed how he would have

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 2746.
Id. at 2742.
Id. at 2748.
Id. at 2748–50 (discussing various video games that are currently on the market in which the goals and
themes of some of these games include murdering in particularly violent fashions, raping women and children,
ethnic cleansing, and reenacting the assassination of President Kennedy and the massacre at Columbine High
School).
152. Id. at 2751.
153. Id. at 2751 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2752–60.
155. Id. at 2761.
156. Id. at 2761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 2762.
158. Id.
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applied both strict scrutiny and a vagueness requirement to this case.159 Justice
Breyer emphasized that California’s statute provides fair notice and is not overly
vague.160

IV. Analysis
The Court correctly concluded that the Act did not pass the strict scrutiny required
of laws that place restrictions on speech.161 However, in reaching this result, the
Court too quickly determined that violent video games are equivalent to other
media of protected speech and failed to explore the possibility that this relatively
new medium of speech may pose new and different challenges.162 If a state wishes to
pass a law restricting minors’ access to violent video games, the law must be
narrowly tailored so that it can pass strict scrutiny,163 and one way to do this would
be to model it after other successful statutes, such as the New York statute that
restricts minors access to obscenity.164
A. The Court Reached the Correct Result That the Act Regulating Content of Violent
Video Games Did Not Pass Strict Scrutiny and Was Unconstitutional
The Court correctly held that laws aimed at restricting the sale of violent video
games are an unconstitutional restriction on content.165 It was previously decided
that content-based restrictions on speech must past strict scrutiny to be considered
constitutional, and the California Act did not pass this level of scrutiny.166 The
government attempted to argue the compelling interest of protecting minors from
harm resulting from playing violent video games, but California’s evidence was
insufficient to show the Court that violent video games and harm to minors are
directly related.167 The studies presented were inconclusive and showed a small
159. Id. (referring to the Court's vagueness doctrine, which states that a law restricting speech is
overinclusive when it is too general and not narrowly tailored to target the specific classification of speech the
law seeks to prevent).
160. Id. at 2763.
161. Infra Part IV.A.
162. Infra Part IV.B.
163. Infra Part IV.C.
164. Infra Part IV.C.
165. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (majority opinion) (“Like the protected books, plays, and movies that
preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary
devices . . . and through features distinctive to the medium . . . [t]hat suffice[] to confer First Amendment
protection.”); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952) (holding that the protections of
the First Amendment do not vary for a new or different medium of communication).
166. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (holding that for a statute
to pass strict scrutiny, it must have a compelling government interest and be narrowly drawn to serve that
interest).
167. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738; see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826–27
(2000) (holding that even if the government interest of protecting children is compelling, a law must comport
with the First Amendment and infringe on the freedom of speech by the least-restrictive means).
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causal connection between violent video games and “loud noises” or “increased
agitation” for several minutes after playing a violent video game.168 Thus, the Court
correctly determined that the evidence was simply not strong enough to support a
compelling government interest. Further, the Court reached the correct outcome
that the Act was not narrowly tailored in the least restrictive way possible.169 The Act
is overinclusive in the fact that it assumes all parents with children who wish to play
violent video games actually care that their children are playing these games.170 The
Court notes that there are some children that may be restricted from buying these
games who have parents that do not care if their children are playing violent
videogames, thus, the act is overinclusive.171 The Court correctly held the Act to be
underinclusive by the fact that it excludes portrayals of violence aimed at children
other than violence in video games.172
B. In Reaching This Result, the Court Too Quickly Assumed That Violent Video Games
Are the Same as Other Media of Speech That Portray Violence, and Instead the Court
Should Have Deferred to the Legislature
In his concurrence, Justice Alito questions the wisdom of the Court’s decision and
recognizes the important need for the Court to “proceed with caution” in an “effort
to understand the new technology . . . [that] may have important societal
implications that will become apparent only with time.”173 Justice Alito stated,
“there are reasons to suspect that the experience of playing violent video games just
might be very different from reading a book, listening to the radio, or watching a
movie or a television show.”174 This argument stems from the Justices’ beliefs that
violent video games are the same as other media of speech.175 Instead of quickly
dismissing video games as being similar to other media depicting violence,176 the
Court should have deferred to the legislature and its studies in determining that
video games present a new and different challenge than other forms of media
available to minors that depict violence.177

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2739.
Id. at 2738.
Id. at 2741.
Id.
Id. at 2742.
Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2737–38 (majority opinion) (“California claims that video games present special problems
because they are ‘interactive,’ in that the player participates in the violent action on screen and determines its
outcome. The latter feature is nothing new: Since at least the publication of The Adventures of You: Sugarcane
Island in 1969, young readers of choose-your-own-adventure stories have been able to make decisions that
determine the plot by following instructions about which page to turn to.”).
177. See infra footnotes 178–213 and accompanying text.
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Video games are a relatively new technology, and have advanced rapidly over the
past decades.178 Although the first “video game” was released in 1958,179 they did not
gain commercial popularity until the first arcade games were released in the 1970s,
followed by the first video game consuls in the same decade.180 In the last four
decades, video games have advanced from simple games like Pong to games where
interactive worlds, which look almost indistinguishable from reality can be created,
manipulated, and altered by the player.181 The array of options available to a player
in a violent video game are far greater than those in a “choose-your-ownadventure-book,” which the Court argues is similar to a violent video game.182 All of
the options of one of these adventure books are contained between the two covers
of the short volume, while the possibilities available to a minor playing a modern
video game are virtually endless.183
One of the most distinct differences between violent video games and other
medium of speech available to minors is the interactivity that video games
provide.184 Reading a book or listening to the radio requires the user to use his
imagination to develop a mental picture of the world being described, while video
games provide visualizations for the user.185 Although television and movies provide
displays, they do not possess the interactive element that video games allow.186 Even
DVDs sold with the capability of watching alternate endings are limited by the
options made available by the creator.187

178. Mark Claypool & Robert W. Lindeman, Panel Discussion, IMGD 1001: Game Development Timeline at
the Worcester Polytechnic Institute, WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INST., http://web.cs.wpi.edu/~imgd1001/a08/
slides/imgd1001_04_GameDevTimeline.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (providing a timeline of the
development of video games and advancements in video game technology over the last several decades).
179. See Kristin Kalning, The Anatomy of the First Video Game, MSNBC (Oct. 23, 2008),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27328345/ns/technology_and_science-games/t/anatomy-first-video-game
(describing the first video game, “Tennis for Two,” that predates “Pong” and “Space Invaders”).
180. John Anderson, Who Really Invented the Video Game, CREATIVE COMPUTING VIDEO & ARCADE GAMES,
Spring 1983, at 8, available at,http://www.digitpress.com/library/magazines/ccvag/ccvag_spring83.pdf.
181. Id.
182. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
183. See James Dunkelberger, The New Resident Evil? State Regulation of Violent Video Games and the First
Amendment 2011 BYU L. REV. 1659, 1675 (2011) (discussing how there is an ever-increasing range of choice as
video games continue to develop); see also History of CYOA, CHOOSE YOUR OWN ADVENTURE,
http://www.cyoa.com/pages/history-of-cyoa (last visited Mar. 5, 2013) (describing the format of Choose Your
Own Adventure books and general statistics about the books).
184. See Dunkelberger, supra note 183, at 1674–79 (describing how video games have a level of interactivity
that is not present in other media of speech).
185. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2748 (Alito, J., concurring) (“These games feature visual imagery and sounds that
are strikingly realistic, and in the near future video-game graphics may be virtually indistinguishable from
actual video footage.” (footnote omitted)).
186. See generally Dunkelberger, supra note 183, at 1674–79 (discussing the ever-increasing interactivity of
video games).
187. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012).
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Specifically, violent video games provide a wide array of options that are new
and much different than other forms of “speech.”188 Some of the newest
interactive video games allow the player to experience a virtual word complete
with sight, sound, touch, and smell, which goes even further beyond what a
person can experience from the media of television or movies that are considered
to be protected by the First Amendment.189 Recent design platforms and their
extensions such as Microsoft’s Kinect allow the user to play without the use of a
gamepad by measuring the player’s full body movements.190 Further, certain
platforms of the game Resident Evil 4 provide users with a chainsaw-shaped
controller so that they can better simulate attacking and cutting up zombies in the
game.191 Artificial intelligence allows for unscripted interaction between the game
player and characters in the video games.192 There is currently no magazine, book,
television show, or movie that allows for the consumer to experience all of
sensory options at one time while acting out tasks involving all five senses in
unscripted and practically uncontrolled environments. These examples help to
show that video games differ materially from protected mediums of speech such
as books, movies, and television.193
The Court should have deferred to the legislature or evidence produced by
experts in the video game industry before determining that violent video games are
virtually the same as other mediums depicting violence that is aimed at minors.194
What the Court terms as Justice Alito’s attempt to describe violent video games to
disgust the Court,195 is actually just a statement of the astounding examples of
violence that are present in some of these graphic video games.196 Minors have
188. See generally Robert Bryan Norris, Jr., Note, It’s All Fun and Games Until Someone Gets Hurt: Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association and the Problem of Interactivity, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 81, 85 (2011)
(discussing the advancements in video game technology and how it is different than other traditional media of
speech).
189. Id. (stating that technologically advanced video games of today are employing the use of every sense of
the user during gameplay).
190. Id. at 87.
191. Id. at 87–88.
192. Id. at 89–91 (discussing how artificial intelligence and physics have helped video game developers
create extremely advanced and interactive video games).
193. Id. at 96–101 (describing various ways in which video games are different than the other previouslyprotected media of speech).
194. See id. at 95–96 (discussing how the Court’s sweeping statement about how video games don’t pose any
different challenges than other media of speech further complicated the problem of how these violent video
games should be treated).
195. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2749 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting the extreme
violence in some of these video games, Justice Alito stated, “[i]n some of these games, the violence is
astounding. Victims by the dozens are killed with every imaginable implement, including machine guns,
shotguns, clubs, hammers, axes, swords, and chainsaws. Victims are dismembered, decapitated, disemboweled,
set on fire, and chopped into little pieces. They cry out in agony and beg for mercy. Blood gushes, splatters, and
pools. Severed body parts and gobs of human remains are graphically shown. In some games, points are
awarded based, not only on the number of victims killed, but on the killing technique employed.”).
196. Id. at 2738 (majority opinion).
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access to video games that allow the user to act out the killings at Columbine High
School,197 rape women,198 and engage in forms of “ethnic cleansing” by gunning
down members of a particular race or ethnicity.199
Evidence and studies conducted by experts in the video game industry have
shown that video game violence is quite different from violence depicted in other
media such as television or books.200 There were thirty-one amici curiae briefs filed
in the Brown case, and some of these were studies conducted by psychologists and
other experts measuring the effects of violent video games on children.201 The main
brief in support of the government, known as the “Gruel Brief,” authored by
thirteen highly recognized media violence experts around the world, focused on
how violent video games can increase violent behavior in children.202 The Gruel
Brief specifically focused on the correlation between violent behavior, nightmares,
outburst, and an increased violence toward women.203 The main brief supporting
VSDA and ESA, known as the “Millett Brief,” was endorsed by eighty-two
psychologists and determined that there was no significant statistical increase in
violent behavior of children who played violent video games.204 Unfortunately, there
is very little statistical evidence provided in either brief about the actual impact that
violent video games have on children, further supporting the fact that there is
simply not enough information about the effects of this relatively new technology.205
197. Kayla Webley, “School Shooter” Video Game to Reenact Columbine, Virginia Tech Killings, TIME (Apr.
20, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/04/20/school-shooter-video-game-reenacts-columbine-virginia-techkillings/.
198. Kayung Lah, ‘RapeLay’ Video Game Goes Viral Amid Outrage, CNN (Mar. 30, 2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03-30/world/japan.video.game.rape_1_game-teenage-girl-japanese-government.
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Another recent study examined the impact of a virtual reality program, Virtual
Iraq, on soldiers returning from war and instances of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD).206 The Virtual Iraq program involves patients wearing a headset and being
exposed to sounds, images, smells, and vibrations that are controlled by a doctor to
simulate some of the experiences soldiers experienced while in Iraq or
Afghanistan.207 The therapy sessions last for one hour, and after the patients talk
about their experiences with a doctor and psychologist.208 The goal of the program is
to reduce the instances of PTSD in members of the U.S. military returning from
combat.209 A study of the results of Virtual Iraq determined that around 80% of
program participants demonstrated a statistical and clinical reduction in PTSD,
anxiety, and depression.210 Although this study offers some statistical evidence about
the impact of video game violence on individuals, it does not specifically address the
impact that violent video games could have on children.211 Other than a handful of
studies that attempt to measure the effects of video game violence on individuals,
there is very little empirical evidence about their impact on minors.212 Thus, the
relatively new technology of video games should have been studied further before
the Court made the sweeping assertion that violent video games are essentially the
same as other media of speech and should be treated accordingly.213
C. If a State Wishes to Regulate Violent Video Game Distribution to Minors, the
Statute Must Be Narrowly Tailored to Specific Depictions of Violence and Obscenity
The only current regulation on video games is the self-regulatory Entertainment
Software Rating Board (ESRB) system.214 California’s Act was the latest of many
failed attempts to impose a mandatory rating system aimed at prohibiting minors
from purchasing violent video games without parental permission.215 In order for a
state to succeed in getting a statute to pass the strict scrutiny that the Constitution
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demands, it will have to take a different approach than those that have been
previously attempted.
As discussed previously, Ginsberg upheld as constitutional an act which
regulated the sale of pornographic materials to minors and expanded the
definition of obscenity to include pornography distributed to minors.216 The
statute in question expanded on the original and often-criticized Miller Test.217
Although California attempted to similarly extend on the statute in Miller as it
was done in Ginsberg, the Court declared that the Act sought to create an entirely
new category of unprotected speech.218 There is great irony in the fact that the
justice system will protect expression that allows a minor to actively participate in
the violent murder and dismemberment of a body, but if the victim happens to be
topless, the Government’s interest in protecting minors suddenly supersedes First
Amendment protection.219
In order to combat this, states should seek to more closely align statutes aimed at
regulating violent video games with the way that the statute in Ginsburg only altered
the obscenity statute in Miller by adding the words “to minors.”220 States could
begin by attempting to regulate violent video games that contain pornography and
appeal to the “prurient interest” or depict acts of sexual violence.221 As mentioned,
many of the violent video games discussed by Justice Alito, and countless more
contain not just violence but interactive scenes with nudity and violent rape, which
could be targeted by states in future laws that attempt to restrict violent video game
sales to minors.222 If a state were to more narrowly tailor a statute to protect the
interest of minors by restricting violent video games that contain obscenity, the
statute would have a greater chance of passing the strict scrutiny that laws
restricting the content of speech must pass.
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Conclusion
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Supreme Court held that
California’s Act regulating violent video game sales to minors without parental
permission was unconstitutional.223 The Court correctly concluded that California’s
Act does not pass the strict scrutiny that is required of laws that attempt to regulate
expression protected by the First Amendment.224 However, the Court too quickly
dismissed the possibility that video games are unlike other media of speech.225 The
Court should not have broadly dismissed violent video games as being akin to other
mediums depicting violence and should have deferred to the experts in the industry
and the legislature before making such a sweeping generalization.226
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